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The Holy Grail of Product Development
Drug discovery is increasingly risky and expensive, with some proposing that it takes approximately $500 million and up to 12 years of research just to get drug candidates into a clinical trial. In order to emerge successfully from the pharmaceutical product development process, estimates suggest a total capitalized cost of $1.3 billion. And these huge investments are being made at a time when approval of new drugs is falling; from 1995 to 2007, the number of new chemical entities approved by the FDA dwindled from 45 to 22. But even regulatory approval is no guarantee of success. The most commonly-cited example of a pre-approved commercial flop is Pfizer’s Exubera, the inhaled insulin therapy. After Exubera failed to meet the expectations of physicians and patients, Pfizer removed it from the market in 2007, resulting in a $2.8 billion loss. Companies need the right clinical development strategy to maximize the commercial prospects of their new products. What forces have combined to create this situation? One component is certainly a competitive and constrained healthcare environment wherein translating innovation into medicines that are both approvable and commercially viable is difficult. Fragmented, complicated company structures with misaligned functional groups preclude the efficient integration of marketplace needs into the developing entity. A reorganization to a more streamlined and versatile model would support a market-driven approach to drug development. Such a marketplace focus should be clearly highlighted in any guiding document for development, thereby enhancing the numbers of commercially viable products entering the market. But are the guiding documents as currently defined up to the task? A Problem of Definition In the quest for a document that captures the essence of a drug under development, many companies have created distinct TPPs that may be differentially defined and utilized within different organizations. “Summary TPP,” “Strategic TPP,” “Weighted TPP,” and the simple “Profile” are just a selection from the genre. While some companies have successfully implemented and managed these variants, attempts to alter the Target Product Profile often generate confusion, problems with version control, and inherent conflicts with format, content, and use. In March 2007, the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) issued draft guidance for industry and review staff that defined the content and format of the TPP. It read, in part, “The purpose of a TPP is to provide a format for discussions between a sponsor and the FDA.” The TPP, in the FDA format, performs a vital role in those discussions and in the ensuing tactical decisions for clinical trial design, which is why it is one important component of an overall strategic intent. Target Product Profiles – Current Practice FDA has positioned its draft guidance on the TPP as facilitating better communication between sponsor and regulatory body, because it summarizes the drug development program in terms of intended labeling content and claims. But while the framework of the FDA guidance facilitates efficient discussion with regulatory bodies, a given product’s profile usually does not embody the market insights necessary to determine the commercial viability of developmental programs. For example, achieving a statistical primary endpoint in pivotal clinical trials may be sufficient for regulatory approval, but may not provide a compelling addition to the therapeutic armamentarium: the result might yield a marketed product that does not deliver a good return on investment for the company. The cessation of Roche’s HIV program is a good example of decision-making that took into account the evolving characteristics of actual products in relation to the marketplace needs and anticipated return. The FDA-defined TPP includes only limited anticipation of market needs in the form of promotional claims, and is devoid of pricing assumptions and other important information necessary to evaluate a drug’s value. Returning to the Exubera example, had Pfizer accurately understood the marketplace needs for insulin products, hundreds of millions of dollars in development and marketing costs could have been re-allocated. Because strategic decisions are based upon marketplace needs, not just regulatory needs, the framework for decision-making must include the targeted value provided to each customer. If a company loses sight of the original desired target (as driven by unmet market needs), assessment of the product can be colored by emergent data from the clinical trials, resulting in a product that the market doesn’t adopt. The targets necessary for a product to achieve forecast valuation are subject to change only in the event of dramatic environmental or competitive events such as government-mandated changes in the treatment of a disease or the appearance of unforeseen technology advances, or a major finding in a competitor’s clinical trials. In the absence of such major events, the vision for the brand should remain inviolable. A Unifying Definition–The Strategic Evaluation Framework Regulatory approval is a recognized imperative. Thus, the framework encompasses FDA’s view of the TPP, but extends it to include other essential parameters that prioritize patients, doctors, and payers. Here’s how it works:
For the Strategic Evaluation Framework to set the foundation for commercial success, companies must evaluate the fdeveloping entity (the latest version of the TPP) against the STP. This comparison will show how far the clinical trial results deviate from the original vision for the product (the STP), and therefore how well or how poorly the resulting drug will serve the market’s unmet needs. Components of the Strategic Evaluation Framework
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