Case Study No. 1: Avastin
Genentech's Avastin is a vascular endothelial growth factor-specific angiogenesis inhibitor indicated for the treatment of
metastatic colorectal cancer (mCRC). The product has experienced significant commercial success since it was launched in 2004
for the treatment of mCRC.
In 2008, FDA later granted marketing approval for Avastin in the first-line treatment of HER2 negative metastatic breast cancer
on the condition that further clinical trials be conducted to establish clinical benefit. Genentech was able to successfully
launch and market the product even with a minimal level of efficacy data in the breast cancer indication. But Avastin's low
level of product differentiation and questionable efficacy data, combined with its large budget impact, led to a heightened
need to generate additional supportive evidence for the breast cancer indication. Genentech used this opportunity to focus
on patient outcomes to establish a clinical benefit that would meet FDA requirements and at the same time address payer needs.
Genentech/Roche conducted two pivotal outcomes trials to address regulatory and payer concerns as part of the conditional
approval. However, these trials not only failed to show improved outcomes, they also raised significant concerns over Avastin's
safety profile. Questionable clinical efficacy in the treatment of breast cancer combined with an unfavorable safety profile
led FDA to fainlly—after much debate—withdraw Avastin's breast cancer indication on November 18.
The takeaway: Launching early with conditional approval is not a silver bullet. Making future promises comes with inherent
risk. Therefore, thorough risk assessment is essential before placing bets on future evidence-generation.
Case Study No. 2: Multaq
With the cardiovascular drug Multaq, the decision facing Sanofi-Aventis was whether to focus on clinical endpoints or patient
outcomes for the product's development. Multaq was challenged to demonstrate product differentiation, particularly after receiving
a non-approvable letter from FDA in 2006 and showing lower efficacy versus the generic standard of care (amiodarone) in 2008.
Multaq also posed a high budget impact for payers in terms of pharmacy spend given the large size and recurrent nature of
the population with atrial fibrillation (AF).
Given Multaq's inferior efficacy and safety profile, Sanofi-Aventis had to refocus its clinical development program on a different
set of value drivers that did not revolve around the product's clinical attributes. The company's new clinical development
program took advantage of the opportunity to focus on outcomes that can demonstrate cost savings through reductions in hospitalizations
and, at the same time, shift focus away from the short-term clinical efficacy of the drug.
Sanofi-Aventis succeeded in this task, while simultaneously differentiating Multaq from the generic standard of care without
having to conduct a direct head-to-head study. The company's development strategy improved the safety profile by redefining
the target patient population to exclude high-cardiovascular-risk patients and addressed regulatory and payer requirements
by focusing on long-term patient outcomes. Their goal was to show reduction in cardiovascular hospitalization.
While Sanofi-Aventis did not include outcomes measures in early development, an outcomes-based trial was successfully used
to address both regulatory access and reimbursement requirements, and led to the approval of Multaq in the US and the EU in
2009. Although valuable time was lost due to the change in development strategy, delaying Multaq's commercial launch and shortening
its available patent life, Multaq is still forecasted to become a blockbuster by 2012.
The lesson learned: Superior efficacy is not strictly essential. Surrogate patient outcomes, when unique, compelling, and
relevant, can adequately address regulatory requirements and support a compelling value proposition for payers.
Case Study No. 3: Humira
Abbott's challenge with Humira was how to differentiate a third-to-market anti-TNF drug launching approximately five years
after Enbrel and Remicade in order to become the biologic market leader for the treatment of rheumatoid arthritis. Given Humira's
high product differentiation at the time of launch, Abbott had to decide whether or not to focus on patient outcomes to further
differentiate the drug.
As one of the first biologic treatments for a large patient population, Humira posed a high economic impact for payers. Abbott
realized that robust payer evidence would be necessary to develop a strong value proposition for Humira, which would support
the long-term success of the drug. Abbott committed to a mix of clinical and outcomes research to address regulatory and payer
requirements for new indication approval and patient access to therapy.
Humira was able to differentiate based on strong efficacy data, favorable dosing frequency compared with Enbrel, a Crohn's
disease indication, and an influential marketing campaign.
As part of Humira's clinical development, Abbott conducted more than 20 clinical trials. A relevant mix of clinical efficacy
and outcomes data further differentiated Humira, allowing it to become the biologic market leader for RA treatment. The drug
has secured favorable formulary status for a costly biologic treatment for RA, and the drug has received multiple NICE recommendations,
even as the category becomes more competitive.
Because Humira has been able enter the market quickly, generate significant product awareness through effective marketing
campaigns, and offer a more convenient dosing schedule, it is expected to experience continued growth and capture a larger
share of the RA market.
Developing an appropriate strategy in order to successfully compile evidence requires substantial time, money, and resources.
Because clinical development is a long-term, high-risk investment, it is necessary to obtain payer input early in development
so that if a company needs to kill a product in the pipeline, it can do so more rationally to avoid any unnecessary waste
As a result of these considerations, organizations need a stable and consistent decision-making authority that can focus on
long-term interests. Simply stated, the goal of evidence generation needs to be to provide the necessary means to achieve
commercial goals in a cost-effective way. Whether or not a branded product meets manufacturers' expectations will all depend
on how the evidence is generated to appropriately address these concerns and how the risk/benefit equation that accompanies
this often-costly endeavor is weighed.
Lujing Wang, MD, is Practice Area Leader, Pricing and Market Access, Campbell Alliance. He can be reached at firstname.lastname@example.org